标题：Consumer Price Fairness and Strategic Retail Obfuscation: An Experimental Approach
摘要：Firms are increasingly using technology to enable targeted, or "personalized" pricing strategies. In settings where prices are transparent to all buyers, however, there is the potential that inter-personal price differences will be perceived as inherently unfair. If perceptions of unfairness cause consumers to avoid sellers who use personalized pricing, then such strategies will be infeasible, and markets based on personalized pricing will collapse. In response, firms may strategically obfuscate their prices so that direct interpersonal comparisons are nearly impossible. In this article, we conduct an experimental analysis of strategic obfuscation in an environment in which price transparency varies, and consumers are inherently inequity-averse. We find that perceptions of peer-induced unfairness can ruin discriminatory pricing schemes, but obfuscation strategies can restore their profitability, and likelihood of survival. We also find, under certain conditions, that price transparency is more profitable than strategic obfuscation.
时间：2016年6月13日下午3:00
地点：信息楼322
主讲人： William Allender